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LIMITED AVAILABILITY
FOR SHIFT EMPLOYMENT: A CRITERION

OF ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION
RALPH ALTMAN,t VIRGINIA LEWI$t

THE PROBLEM
A 1942 decision of the Virginia Unemployment Compensation
Commission dealt with the claim of a woman worker who had refused
an offer of rotating shift work about 12 miles from her home. She had
formerly been employed at rotating shift work but now, because of the
necessary care of her month-old infant and her other children, she could
no longer accept any night work. The Commissioner said: "In my
opinion night shift work for a mother with an infant child, who is
unable to arrange for the proper care of the child during her absence
from home, would not be suitable work." Despite this finding the
Commissioner concluded that the claimant was unavailable for work
and therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits. She had, he said,
removed herself from the current available labor market because she
could no longer accept her usual type of job.'
In Vermont an unemployment compensation referee, in 1942, made
a similar ruling in the case of an unemployed woman worker who could
not accept third-shift work at night, because she had no one to care
for her 19-month-old baby during those hours. She was willing and
able to accept work on the other two shifts but there were no openings
for her. There was no other industry employing women in the area
2
where she lived in which she would be qualified for employment.
A 1943 decision of a Kansas Labor Department Appeals Referee
concerned a claimant who had quit her job when she was transferred
from the night shift to day work. At the time there were no day
nurseries in her community and she could find no one to care for her
two small children. Subsequently, day nurseries in the coriimunity
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were equipped to answer her needs and she was ready to accept work
on any shift. The referee held that she was unavailable for work and
ineligible for unemployment benefits during the time she was unable to
accept day work. He said: "To be available for full-time commercial
employment one must be ready, willing and able to accept work on any
of the regular shifts." 3
Since the war began unemployment compensation has been faced
with this bedrock question-limited availability. Every State unemployment compensation law contains, in one form or another, the requirement that claimants must be "avaiiable for work" in order to
receive benefits. But what is "availability"? Is it complete and absolute
readiness, willingness and ability to accept any and every job-total
availability? Or is it something less? How much less? State unemployment compensation agencies have, ever since they started paying
benefits, been required to answer these questions. The war, howeve,
has phrased these questions for the State agencies in their most acute
form. "Limited availability" cases involve instances where the employability of claimants is restricted as to the time, place, kind or other
conditions of the work they are willing or able to accept. Limited
availability questions have often arisen in wartime in the form of "shift
employment" cases. These are cases where workers have either refused
to accept night work or have designated certain work shifts as unacceptable to them. As might be expected, most of the workers who have so
limited their employability have been women, usually mothers of young
children. Beset by employer pressures on the one hand and by social
considerations on .the other, unemployment compensation tribunals and
administrators have been forced to devote considerable time and thought
to the general problem of limited availability.
It has been generally understood that "availability" is synonymous
with "attachment to the labor force" or, as it is sometimes said, "attachment to the labor market." This understanding, however, has contributed little to specific interpretation of the term "availability."
Although the unemployment compensation statutes generally set
forth a clear, positive requirement that a claimant must be "available
for work," an examination of the provisions of the ordinary State unemployment compensation law shows that the legislature could not have
intended to require total availability. For example, all State unemployment compensation laws disqualify claimants who refuse offers of work.
The great majority of State laws, however, provide that, before a
claimant can be disqualified for a work refusal, it must be shown that
the work was suitable for him and that he had no good cause for refusing. The unemployment compensation laws ordinarily direct that
' U. C. I. S., 8256-Kan. A, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 12.
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in determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual
the State unemployment compensation agency shall consider the degree
of risk involved to the individual's health, safety, and morals, his
physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings,
his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in
his customary occupation, and the distance of the offered work from
his residence. Furthermore, in compliance with Section 1603(a)(5).
of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, all State unemployment
compensation laws provide that benefits shall not be denied to any other4
wise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work * under any
of the following conditions: (a) if the position offered is vacant due
directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute; (b) if the remuneration, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially
less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work
in the locality; (c) if as a condition of being employed the individual
would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from joining any bona fide labor- organization.
Thus, it seems obvious that availability for work must mean availability for suitable work.6 It follows that claimants are free to impose
some restrictions upon their employability without impairing their
"availability" for work.
SIGNIFICANCE OF VARIATIONS IN STATE LAWS

Although the standard provision as to availability in State unemployment compensation laws is that a worker must be "able to work
and available for work," a substantial minority of the States vary from
this pattern. Fourteen of the 51 jurisdictions require more than merely
"available for work." These States are: Alabama, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York,
6
Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
As a matter of fact most State Employment Compensation Laws go beyond
the Federal requirement and say that "no work shall be deemed suitable and
benefits shall not be denied" to any otherwise eligible worker for refusing to
accept new work which violates these standards.
' Stella v. Downyflake Restaurant, 126 Conn. 441, 11 A. (2d) 848 (1940);
U. C. I. S., Benefit Series: 7189-Ala. A, Vol. 5, No. 4; 6686-Calif. R, Vol. 4,
No. 12; 7705-Calif. A, Vol. 5, No. 12; 7778-Del. R, Vol. 6, No. 2; 1467-Ind. A,

Vol. 2, No. 5; 3575-Me. A, Vol. 3, No. 6; 6403-N. Y. A, Vol. 4, No. 9; 704-N. C.
A, Vol. 1, No. 8; 6963,-N. C. A, Vol. 5, No. 2; 3589 N. Dak. A, Vol. 3, No. 6;
4520-Okla. A, Vol. 3, No. 10; 2692-Ore. A, Vol. 3, No. 2; 6793-Wash. A, Vol. 4,
No. 12; 6248-Ind. Ct. D, Vol. 4, No. 8.
'ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1940) tit. 26, §213(C); Ky. REv. STAT. (1942)

§341.350(3), (4); Me. Pub. Laws, 1935, c. 192 as amended; MASS. ANN. LAWS
(Michie, 1932) c. 151A, §24(b); Micir. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936)
§17.530(C); MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §4337-26(c); Mo. STAT. ANN.
(Stipp. 1940) p. 4770, §13194-9(c); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. (Darlington, Supp.
1939) §3303.7(c); NEW Yoax UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAW §§502(10),
503(1), 506(2); OHio GEN., CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §1345-6(1); R. I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. (1938) C. 284, §7(2); WASH. REv. STAT.*ANN. (Remington, Supp.
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Summarizing these exceptional laws we find that three of them require that the claimant be "seeking work"--Minnesota, Missouri, and
Washington. Three require the claimant to be "unable to obtain work
in his usual occupation or in any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted and trained"--Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio.
Other exceptional concepts deal more directly with the question of
limited availability. While Kentucky requires that a claimant be available for "suitable work," Washington demands availability for "any
suitable work" (emphasis ours). Michigan and West Virginia deal
with one aspect of limitations upon employability and require that the
individual be available for "full-time work." Rhode Island requires
availability for work "whenever duly called for work through the employment office." Alabama and Michigan deal with matters. of locality
and require that a claimant be available for work either in a place
where he earned some of his base period wage credits or in a place
where it may reasonably be expected (or the commission finds) that
there is. available work of the kind for which the claimant must hold
himself available. The kind of work the Michigan or Alabama claimant
is required to take is better understood by examining the favored type
of availability clause among these exceptional 14 States. In addition
to Alabama and Michigan there are four other States, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, and West Virginia, which in one way or another require
availability for work for which the claimant "is fitted by prior training
and experience."'' * Michigan adds an entirely new element by requiring that the-claimant be available not only for "work of a character
which he is qualified to perform by past experience or training" but
also that he be available for work of a character generally similar to
work for which he has previously received wages.
What effect do these atypical provisions as to availability have upon
cases involving a limitation by the worker upon the time of day or
shift in which he will work? Certainly it cannot be said that "seeking
work" has anything at all to 'do with our case. Conceivably, a requirement that a claimant be unable to obtain work in his usual occupation
or a job which he is reasonably fitted to take may have a bearing. For
1940) §9998-104(c); W. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §2366(75); Wis.

STAT.

(1941) §108.04(1).
7*The exact provisions vary. The requirement just mentioned is the West
Virginia wording. Alabama xequires that a claimant be available for "work of a
character which he is qualified to perform by past experience or training." Maine
requires that he be "available for work at his usual or customary trade, occupation, profession, or business as his prior experience shows him to be fitted or
qualified." The Minnesota requirement is that he must be "available for work
in his usual trade or occupation or in any other trade or occupation for which
he demonstrates he is reasonably fitted." Ohio provides that he must be "available for work in his usual trade or occupation, or in any other trade or occupation
for which he is reasonably fitted."
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example, a worker to whom night work is available but who refuses to
accept anything but day work may have difficulty in proving that he
is unable to obtain work in his usual occupation or one for which he is
reasonably fitted.s* The applicability of the Washington requirement,
that a claimant must be available for "any suitable work," to a worker's
restrictions as to shift employment would seem to depend entirely upon
whether or not work on the excluded shift was suitable for ihat worker.
The Kentucky requirement that the claimant must be available for
"suitable work" is nothing more than legislative codification of the
ordinary rule that obtains in other States. The requirement, in Michigan and West Virginia, that the claimant must be available for "fulltime work" does nothing more than has been achieved in other States
by interpretation of the word "work." The usual meaning given the
phrase "full-time work" has been in terms of a full work-week of 40
and sometimes 48 hours. Evidently this should have no relation to
the question of availability for work on particular shifts. Obviously,
too, a requirement that the claimant be available for work in a particular locality has no direct bearing on the matter of restriction of
the claimant's employability to certain times of day. So also a requirement that the claimant be available for work for which he is fitted by
prior training or experience or even for work similar to the work for
which he has previously received wages apparently has no immediate
connection with any restriction that may exist upon his employment on
particular shifts. Despite the fact that these latter provisions-as to
localities where the claimant must be available and as to the type of
work for which he must be available-have no immediate bearing upon
restrictions as to shift employment, nevertheless they do set a labor
market pattern for the claimant. These requirements create for each
claimant certain occupations for which he must be available or localities
where he must be able to work. By so doing they set an industrial
pattern which will sometimes determine whether or not the claimant's
particular restriction as to the time of day in which he will work will
actually take him out of the labor force.
None of these non-standard availability provisions can be said to
require "total availability" in the sense of complete availability for any
work during any and all hours. The most stringent provision-the
Washington provision-requires availability for "any suitable work."
Obviously that is something less than "any work" or "all work." "Fulltime work," the Michigan-West Virginia requirement, certainly -does
not mean 24-hour-a-day; neither 'does it necessarily mean work at all
'* The usual statutory criteria of suitable work may tend to take some of the
harshness out of this kind of law. Thus, in the case suggested, if night work is
unsafe for the worker's health, safety, or morals, for example, such work might
be omitted as unsuitable work, from consideration as a test of his availability.
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times during the 24-hour period. No American unemployment compensation statute has such a specific requirement. In fact, no American
unemployment compensation law specified the time of day when a claimant must be available for work.
WARTImE RISE OF THE PROBLEM

We have said that the war has made the meaning of the availability
provisions an acute question. Shift employment, relatively infrequent
before the defense program, has assumed considerable proportions during the war. Some workers have refused to accept this change; many,
because of health or domestic circumstances, are in no position to do so.
Thus we find that some unemployment compensation claimants limit
their employability to particular work shifts, .usually the more favorable or day shifts. It is understandable that in wartime there should
be a marked tendency to refuse to consider as eligible for benefits,
those workers who will not accept otherwise suitable work that is
offered them during night hours. The pressure of public opinion,
which finds it difficult to understand why unemployment benefits should
be paid to an-unemployed worker whose skills can be used at a time of
day when he cannot or will not work, has strengthened this tendency.
Often too, the fact that the unfavorable work shift was the only shift
open to a worker in a particular establishment or in a particular indus try-as the result of a custom of the industry, a rule of the employer,
or a union contract-has persuaded the unemployment compensation
agency to rule that the claimant who will not or cannot work on that
shift has cut himself off from the market for his services.
Largely because of these considerations, there has been, in recent
months, a wave of restrictive rulings in this field. In order to receive
*benefits, more and more unemployed workers have been required to
hold themselves available for work at all hours of the day. There are
important social as well as legal aspects to this limited availability
problem. -Iowmuch should the workers' freedom of choice be limited?
Most administrative appealed decisions covering shift employment have
dealt with the claims of married women who, because of the need to care
for their children, specified particular shifts as the only time they could
work. To say that these individuals cut themselves off from the active
labor force is particularly unfair, since they, by the withholding of
benefits, are under pressure to make the socially unwise choice of
accepting work at such hours that they must neglect their children.
These social issues, as well as the legal questions, are raised by the
decisions set out below.
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JUDSON MILLS V. THE S. C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
9

COMMISSION AND SPEARs

Spears, an unemployed cotton mill hand, limited his employability
to the first shift. He could not work on the second shift because he had
to look after his children while his wife worked; he could not work on
the third shift because of his health. The claims examiner disqualified
the claimant for a refusal of suitable work. On appeal to the Appeals
Referee the determination was reversed, but Spears was held unavailable for work. Spears appealed to the Commission, which reversed the
decision of the Appeals Referee and adopted the determination of the
claims examiner. The employer then appealed to the Court of Common
Pleas which reversed the Commission's decision and held that the claimant was not available for work.
The court in its opinion seemed to recognize properly the general
principle involved, that the question of availability for work is essentially one of degree. It did not base its holding on this general principle, for it went on to state that refusal to accept suitable work per se
results in unavailability. This statement seems inconsistent with a recognition of the question of availability as one of degree. The court
also said: "To be able and available for work a claimant must be able
and available for a majority of the average number of hours normally
and customarily worked in his occupation each day with a further condition that there must be a minimum of eight hours per day within
which the claimant could accept work if it be offered." It thus appears
that the court itself was unable to state dearly the main characteristics
of availability which are essential to a claimant's eligibility for benefits.
In attempts to determine the legal content of the availability requirement, it has usually been held that if a claimant is ready and willing to work and if his personal circumstances are such that he can
accept work, he has fulfilled this requirement.' 0 Furthermore, the
"work" which the claimant must be willing to accept is usually deemed
to be suitable work." With these concepts in mind let us examine further the court's opinion in the Judson Mills Case.
If we assume that the claimant in the instant case was actually
willing to work, we must determine whether or not his personal circumstances rendered unsuitable work during the hours which he excluded. The claimant was unable to accept third-shift work because
he had been told by his physician to discontinue night work which was
injurious to his eyes. It would seem, therefore that under Section
' Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County, S. C. (Dec. 9, 1942), C. C. H.
S. C. Par. 8118; U. C. I. S., 7944-S. C. Ct. D, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 5.

"SOCIAL SEcuarry YEAIBooo
"1 See note 5, supra.

(Social Security Board 1940) 35.
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7035-82 (7035-85(c) (1)12 of the South Carolina law which provides
in part that "in determining whether or not any work is suitable for
an individual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved
to his health, . . ." work on the third shift for this claimant was not
sutiable work within the meaning of the statute. (Italics provided.)
Spears could not accept second shift work because he had to care
for his children during those hours. The language of the South Carolina law readily lends itself to two interpretations other than the one
the court apparently adopted. (1) The provisions of Section 7035-82
(7035-85) (c) (1)" a (quoted above) should not be regarded as limiting
the elements of suitability which the Commission may consider to those
which the section specifies. So treated, the Commission, after considering the factors enumerated in (c) (1), would be free to take into account
any other factors affecting the suitability of the work in question. It
would be possible, therefore, for the Commission to decide that the
claimant's personal circumstances were such as to render work on the
second shift unsuitable for him. (2) Since there is nothing in the language of Section 7035-82 (7035-85) (c) (1)14 which covers the claimant's
reason for his unwillingness to accept such work, it may be considered
that second-shift work is suitable for the claimant. The necessity that
the claimant be at home to look after the children, however, contsitutes
"good cause" for his refusal of the work. Thus, no disqualification for
his refusal of suitable work would be in order.
A- finding that the claimant was available for work is not inconsistent
with either of these views. If the first view is the one adopted, the
work would be unsuitable and as such would not affect the claimant's
availability, since the general requirement is that a claimant need be
available for suitable work only. On the other hand, if the second view
is accepted, "availability" need be consonant only with such suitable
work for which no good cause for refusal exists.
Even if the approach is taken that availability for suitable work is
required, regardless of the sufficiency of the claimant's cause for refusing, it does not follow that Spears was unavailable for work. Let
us accept the court's unspoken premise that second-shift work was
suitable for Spears. Does it follow, merely from the fact that he would
accept work on only one of the two shifts available for him, that he
was detached from the active labor force? Conclusions as to attachment to the labor force can hardly be based solely on statutory construction. They depend upon economic facts, facts as to the claimant's
skills, training and experience, facts as to the work for which the
1
' 2 S.

C. CODE ANN. (1942) §7035-84(c).

23sIbid.

24

Ibid.
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claimant is accessible, facts as to the industrial practices in the claimant's labor market area.
The court, however, undertook no such discussion of the problem.
A worker, according to the court, "must be truly and actually able and
available to accept any suitable work which may be offered to him. If
his availability is materially limited or restricted it cannot then be said
that he is in fact in the labor market or that actually he is out of work
because no work can be had by him. .... There is no reason to examine

the causes occasioning the claimant's inability to work on the second
and third shifts." It appears that the court not only disregarded the
concept of "good cause" but it did not even discuss the suitability of
the work for the claimant. Thus, on an assumption of suitability, it
was found that the claimant imposed such an undue restriction on his
availability for work as was tantamount to a withdrawal from the labor
force.
Insofar as shift employment is concerned, this case holds that a
claimant must be able and available for a majority of the average number of hours customarily worked each day in the industry.
JUDSON MILLS V. S. C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

COMMISSION AND GAINES'

5

Mrs. Gaines was employed on the third shift. A relative had looked
after her children while she worked. The relative left and Mrs. Gaines,
unable to secure anyone to care for her children, left her work to remain
at home. She was offered work on the third shift on several occasions
but refused on the ground that sfie was available for work only on the
first or second shifts. A deputy's holding that she was unavailable for
work was affirmed by the Appeals Referee. The claimant appealed to
the Commission which reversed the Appeals Referee and held that she
had left her work voluntarily with good cause and was available for
work, since she was able and available for work on the first and second
shifts. Employer then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which
reversed the Commission and held the claimant unavailable for work.
The court's conclusion was "that in order to be entitled to benefits
under the Act the unemployed individual must be able to and available
for the work which he or she has been loing," on the shift that she
has worked. The court's only support for this conclusion was an Ohio
case, Broun-Brockmeyer Company v.Board of Review.,*
An interpretation of the term "work," in the statutory phrase "avail" Court of Common Pleas, Greenville County, S. C. (August 10, 1943), aff'd,
28 S. E. (2d) 535 (1944).
a*70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. (2d) 152 (1942) ; U. C. I. S., 7912-Ohio Ct.
D, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 4. Under the facts of the Ohio case it would appear
to be questionable whether the claimant was physically able to work.
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able for work," to mean the individual's last job seems without support
in the South Carolina unemployment compensation law (or in any
American unemployment compensation law).17* In the disqualification
provisions for voluntary leaving1 8 and misconduct 9 the term "most
recent work" is used. Thus, if it were intended by the legislature that
availability should be confined to an individual's last employment, the
legislature could have specifically imposed such a limitation.
Under the court's decision if a claimant were dismissed from a job
under circumstances which would make the job unsuitable for him, such
claimant would be ineligible for benefits if he were not available for this
last job. Section 7035-82(c) (1)20 provides in part that: "In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety,
and morals, his physical fitness and prior training." In the light of this
provision it is quite possible that an individual's last job would not constitute "suitable work." The legislature could hardly have intended
the anomalous result of the court's ruling that an individual should be
ineligible for benefits if he were not available for such unsuitable work.
Provisions enacted by the legislature protect such individual from pressure to accept work if it is injurious in the respects specified. It appears
that the legislative intent as expressed in the disqualification provisions
and in the availability provision is rec6ncilable only on the theory that a
claimant's availability is not dependent on his willingness to engage in
his last employment.
The second question presented by the court's decision is whether a
claimant who is available for work on two out of three shifts is available for work within the meaning of Section 7035-84(c).21 The two
shifts for which the claimant was available included the hours from
seven or eight in the morning until eleven or twelve at night, thus including more than the normal working hours of the public as a whole.
On the basis of the view expressed in Iudson Mills v. S. C. Unenmployment Compensation Commission and Spears22* discussed above, the
claimant in the instant case would have been held available fot work,
since she was available "for a majority of the average number of hours
normally and customarily worked in his (her) occupation each day."
The court in the first Judson Mills Case stated further: "It should not
17*

See discussion under Significance of Variations in State Laws, supra.

'IS. C. CODE AqN. (1942) §7035-85 (a).
11 S. C. CoDE ANx. (1942) §7035-85(b). 2 Ibid.
'0 See note 12, supra.
2* See note 9, supra.
It is interesting to note that the court in the Gaines Case said that it was
the first case in which it was necessary to determine the content of the term
"availability." The same court (with a different judge sitting) had said approximately the same thing when the decision was rendered in the Spedrs Case on
December 9, 1942, only eight months before the decision in the Gaines Case.
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be required, however, that the actual hours of the dtay in which the
claimant could accept work be the identically same hours in which he
was last employed unless he be available for no other kind of work and
the hours in which he is available are not included in the work day of
his industry." Mrs. Gaines obviously met the additional standard suggested in the first Judson Mills Case.
The court in the second Judson Mills Case was influenced by the
theory that the experience rating provisions control the definition of
involuntary unemployment.23* In accordance with this theory the court
considered the claimant's right to benefits in terms of employer responsibility for her unemployment. Since it was obvious that her employer
was not the proximate cause of her unemployment, the court concluded
that her unemployment was not involuntary in nature. The legislature
in establishing experience rating expressly provides that "nothing in
this section shall be construed to limit benefits payable pursuant to
Section 1035-83. ' ' 24 It should be noted that even if an employer were
to achieve complete employment stabilization, his tax raie would be .9
per cent of his pay roll. This fact indicates that the employer's fault
in not attaining employment stabilization is not the sole basis for the
imposition of the tax. Hence, the testing of the claimant's benefit
rights in these terms has the effect of adding a new eligibility requirement. It might also be noted that there seems little or no relation between: employer responsibility and the criteria set forth in Section
7035-82(c) (1)25 as measuring-sticks of the suitability of offered work:
degree of risk involved to health, safety and morals, physical fitness,
prior training, -etc.
It appears that the court's theory is fundamentally unsound in that
it does not recognize that the underlying purpose of the South Carolina
unemployment compensation law is to furnish compensation for those
who are unemployed through no fault of their own. It does not follow
that stabilization of employment is not an important subsidiary of the
program. But it should be recognized that in a program of unemployment compensation the primary motive is to provide benefits, not to
reduce tax rates. The concept of availability for work should have no
relation to the presence of experience rating provisions. In fact, most
State unemployment compensation laws as originally enacted, contained
their present availability provisions and contained no experience rating.
With respect to shift employment this case stands for the proposition that a claimant, in order to meet the eligibility requirements of
23* "Experience rating" is a device for unemployment compensation tax computation for employers upon the basis of their experience with -respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct relation to unemployment risk.
' S. C. CODE Axx. (1942) §7035-87(c) (1).

11 See note 12, supra.
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the South Carolina law, must be available not only for the work which
she has been doing, but also for the shift on which she has been
working.
DINOVELLIS

v.

DANAHiER, ADMINISTRATOR 20

Claimant refused to accept work on any but the day shift because
she had someone to take care of her children during the day but she
felt that she should be at home to supervise them in the evening. Although she made independent efforts to find work, she refused to accept
a referral to a job on a swing shift. The agency denied benefits on
the ground that she had placed such restrictions on her availability as
to render her unavailable for work. The commissioner, however, found
her available for work on the ground that she was ready, willing, and
able to work. The court held that the claimant refused to accept employment for personal reasons not connected with the suitabiltiy of the
work offered and, therefore, she was unavailable f6r work.
'In the language of the court this case "presents the question whether
in order that an individual otherwise qualified to be paid benefits under
the Unemployment Compensation Act, to enforce his right to them,
must be willing to accept employment at any hours of the day or
whether for reasons of personal convenience he may refuse employment
offered him without forfeiting his right to the benefit payments for
which the Act provides, because the same does not fit into his personal
circumstances even though he be physically and mentally fit to perform it and it is such as is reasonably adapted to his abilities and
experience."
The court goes on to say that after an individual has been found
initially eligible, there exists a duty "'to apply for available, suitable
work when directed to do so by the public employment bureau or the
administrator' and 'to accept suitable work when offered him by the
public employment bureau or by an employer.'. . ... Moreover, the
court says, the conditions relevant to suitability of work as detailed in
Section 1339(e) (b) (1) all relate to conditions of employment or economic factors. This is correct and the court further states correctly
that none of these conditions describes an offered job as unsuitable
because of the hours during which the work is to be performed. Section 1339(e) (b) (1) provides in part: "In determining whether or not
any work or self-employment is suitable for an individual, the administrator may consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety
and morals, his physical fitness and prior training and experience, his
length of unemployment, his prospects for securing local work in his
customary occupation and the distance of the available work from his
residence." (Emphasis ours.)
26

Docket No. 69078, Superior Court, Hartford County, Conn. (June 25, 1943).
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Thus, by the terms of this provision, certain factors are enumerated
which may be considered in reaching a determination as to the suitability of a particular job. The administrator, however, is not limited
to a consideration of these factors alone in reaching his determination
and, therefore, he is free to consider any additional factors which he
deems relevant to the issue of suitability.
Moreover, the legislature in enacting Section 1339(e) (b) (1) clearly
authorizes a consideration of factors personal to the claimant--i.e., the
degree of risk involved to his health, his physical fitness, etc. Here is
a plain statement that conditions which are personal to the claimant
and beyond the control of the employer may be decisive in ascertaining
the claimant's right to benefits. The court, therefore, as noted above,
was correct in stating that Section 1339(e) (b) (1) described conditions
relating to conditions of employment or economic factors. The court,
however, did not go far enough. Some of these conditions of employment are to be considered in terms of factors personal to the claimant.
Accordingly, a factory might have the best lighting equipment available for night work and yet night work under those circumstances
might well be injurious to a particular worker. Such conditions of employment, the best developed by modern science, and although suitable
for thousands of other individuals, would be insufficient to render the.
work suitable for a specified claimant. It is inevitable (as well as desirable), under the Connecticut statute, that personal factors should be
considered in determining the suitability of work.
The closing paragraphs of the court's opinion are interesting because the influence of the experience rating provisions is clearly
indicated.
"However, that may be, the fact cannot be overlooked that the legislation is social in character and the attainment of its objectives is made
possible only by the imposition of a tax upon the pay rolls of all employers within its field of operation, which becomes a cost of operation
of every business, enterprise or industry so affected. No question is
raised as concerns the validity of the Act as a valid exercise of the
police power, but if the moneys so raised by such taxation were to be
made expendable to persons out of employment who might refuse to
accept employment for no cause related to the reasonable suitability
of it, but for other reasons wholly personal or appertaining only to their
convenience, it would be obvious that the proceeds of such taxation
would be spent to the extent that they were permitted, for purposes
having no attachment to unemployment resulting from economic forces
or related to any legitimate public concern. Legislation of that character
would certainly be of very doubtful validity. 27

(Footnote supplied.)

"The conclusion is that the plaintiff is not 'available for work' within
the meaning of the Act."
" Compare the language of the Georgia Board of Review, infra. See note
31, post.
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The Connecticut statute, unlike the one in South Carolina, contains
no provision that nothing in the section establishing experience rating
shall be construed to limit the payment of benefits. It would seem,
however, that even in the absence of such a provision, the propriety
of denying benefits because the payment of benefits might increase the
employer's cost of operation is questionable. Benefits should be granted
or denied according to the merits of each case and without consideration
of the effect of such grant or denial on the employer's experience rating.
According to the court, a claimant in order to be available for work
must be willing to accept any suitable employment at any time on any
shift. There is no discussion by the court as to whether or not the
claimant had "good cause" for refusing the offered work.
v. DANAHER, ADmINISTRATOR 2 8
This 'decision represents an interesting and heartening deviation
from the rule of the Dinovellis decision.
Mrs. Carani was a 40-year-old married woman and the mother
of seven children, ranging in age from 6 to 19. In her last employment she had worked on the 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. shift. Upon the advice
of her doctor, she quit the job because it was too heavy for her. She
was disqualified not because of any unjustified refusal of suitable work
but because a routine examination revealed that she was unwilling to
accept work other than on the second shift. She put this restriction
upon her availability because she wishes to take care of her children
and prepare their meals during the earlier hours of the day. As a
result of her independent effort to obtain second shift work, she was
able, on June 4, 1943, to obtain a satisfactory job with an airplane
company. She was unemployed from March until June, 1943.
The court's opinion points out that previous Connecticut decisions, 20
both judicial and administrative, have held that a claimant who was
available for part-time work only and for work which was similar to
that in which he had earned his wage credits was available for work.
The court noted that British 'decisions also allowed claimants to select
the hours of employment so long as there was a market for that kind
of Work. The court reached the conclusion that the appellant was
"ready, eager, and anxious to accept employment; there is a market on
the shift selected by her; and thus she is available for work in the same
type of employment in which she earned her wage credits." Therefore,
said the court, the claimant was available for work.
CARANI

11 Docket No. 69595, Superior Court, Hartford County, Conn. (Oct. 18, 1943),
U. C. I. S., 8416-Conn. Ct. D, Ben. Ser., Vol. 7, No. 3.
" Egan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Docket No. 59738, Superior Court,
Hartford County, Conn. (March 15, 1939); Keller v. Brown-Thomson, Inc.,
Docket No. 59737, Superior Ct., Hartford County, Conn. (March 16, 1939) ; U. C.
866-A-41; U. C. 50-A-43.
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A note of caution should be sounded concerning this decision. Because the court mentioned the claimant's availability for the kind of
work in which she had earned her wage credits, this decision might be
taken to mean that a claimant who is available for some other shift
than the one on which he had earned his wage credits is not available
for work. In this connection, it should be noted that the entire first
portion of the decision (where there is reference to the claimant's availability for work similar to that in which she had earned her wage
credits) has been taken almost bodily from the administrative decision
ren'dered by the Commissioner. The following statements in the court
opinion (apparently original with the court and not borrowed from the
administrative decision) show no concern with the relationship between
the work for which the claimant is now available and the work she had
previously done.
"This claimant, ordinarily, would not be required to work. Realizing
that she is required to try to earn money in order to support and take
care of her family, she is endeavoring to do what she thinks is her
duty to her family. She meets it in the way which is most consistent
with her desire to earn her living and, at the same time, to comply with
her duty as a mother of these children. In addition to this her occupation is such that it is of benefit to the war endeavor. Her difficulty
arises out of her attempt to meet all of these obligations in a way consistent with normal effort. This seems to account for her desire to
work on the particular shift on which she has elected to work. Such
attitude ought to be encouraged. The record does not show that any
inconvenience or harm comes to anyone by reason of her election."
Furthermore, an inference that the court intended to suggest that a
claimant who is available for some shift other than the one on which
he earned his wage credits is unavailable for work hardly seems warranted in view of all the facts in the case. Before her unemployment
Mrs. Carani worked for the Hartford Machine Screw Company, doing
bench work. She was forced to quit after she was transferred to
machine operations. The work she ultimately obtained, after her unemployment, was a job as an inspector with the United Aircraft Corporation. These facts do not readily permit the conclusion that Mrs.
Carani was available for exactly the same kind of work in which she
earned her wage credits. Probably it was, in a general way, similar
work for which she was available and it was on the same shift. Viewing the case as a whole and considering the authorities cited by the
court, the most reasonable conclusion would seem to be that the court
intended to state nothing more than this minimal rule: Where a claimant limits his availability to work of the same general type and on the
same shift in which he earned his wage credits there can be no doubt
of his availability, particularly when there is a reasonable explanation
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for the limitation. As to other limitations-to other kinds of work on
other shifts-no inference should be drawn from the court's words.
The opinion in this case represents a departure from the ruling in
the Dinovellis Case discussed above. Although the same court (but
with different judges sitting) decided both cases, there is no reference
to the Dinovellis Case in the Carani decision. The two cases would
appear to be irreconcilable, even after allowance has been made for
the fact that the claimant in the latter case had actually demonstrated
her availability by securing a job of the type to which she had restricted
herself. Under the rule of the Dinovellis Case, a claimant in order to
be available for work must be willing. to accept any suitable employment at any time on any shift.
SHIFT EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The mechanistic legal approach of the Judson Mills Cases and the
Dinovellis decision becomes all the more striking when the social aspects
of the subjects are considered. The decisions we have discussed are
typical. Their facts have been repeated over and over in hundreds of
administrative decisions concerning restrictions upon shift employment.
Usually the claimants are women; usually they have young children;
usually they cannot accept night work. These claimants and the claimants in the cases we have discussed are of importance to their State
and their nation not only as potential workers but as parents and
citizens as well. These decisions leave real doubts as to whether the
litigants' briefs presented this "social" side of the picture to the courts.
Recently the Women's Bureau of United States Department of
Labor made a survey of 137 plants in New Jersey devoting 50 percent
or more of their production to war contract work. On the matter of
shift employment the Bureau reported :30
"In general, women who have worked on either the evening or the
graveyard shift do not like it. The most frequent reason given concerns irregularity in sleeping and eating, resulting in fatigue and sleepiness during working hours on the one hand, and indigestion and loss
of weight on the other. Young people complain that the evening shift
interferes with recreation and social life. Married women object to
being away from their families in the late afternoon and evening, and
many perform their household tasks during the day and are tired when
work-time comes. Of those who reported that they liked night work,
the chief reason given was the fact that they had the daytime hours
free in which to take care of their children and do their housework.
Not infrequently their husbands were on the day shift and took over
the children's care when the women left for work. Some women prefer
the night shift because the noise and confusion are considerably reduced, and a few like it because it is cooler.
"°Women Workers in Some Expanding Wartime Industries, New Jersey,
1942, Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 197, pages 18 and 19.
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"Married women, especially those with children, were somewhat more
numerous than single women among those who preferred to work in
the evening, that is, on the second shift. Thirty percent of the 696
women workers interviewed had children. Most of these mothers had
more than one child, and in four-fifths of the cases at least one of the
children was under 14 years old. A substantial proportion of the
mothers had children under 6. Children in the younger groups require
constant adult supervision and care. Those who are attending school
should be in a responsible person's charge before and after school
hours, yet of 167 mothers with children under 14 years, as many as 38,
well over one-fifth, left their children to their own devices while at
work. The children simply took care of themselves. More than half
the workers left their children with husbands or other relatives and
some had older children who took care of the younger. Few of the
mothers employed help or patronized the day nursery. These data indicate a very real problem in view of the increasing number of housewives who are taking war jobs in industries."
On October 1, 1943, the Office of War Information released a
report in which it discussed the recent increases in juvenile delinquency.
Considering the effect of the war upon juvenile delinquency, this report
states:
"The connection between war and delinquency is not spelled out in
court statistics because juveniles are brought into court for the same
specific offenses (stealing,. sex offenses, acts of mischief) that they were
before the war.
"The connection, however, is there. Father has gone to war; mother
has gone to work. Homes are crowded. There is no place for the
youngsters to play, no place .for the older girls to entertain. The living
room is a bedroom, youngsters are pushed into the street, may end up
in a cheap hotel.
"It is true that many of these factors were present in peace time. But
investigation reveals that war has accentuated old problems, woven them
into a complex pattern for which there is no neat solution.
"There is evidence that the present employment of a large number of
women in war industries is resulting in lack of supervision of younger
children and lack of sympathy with older children.
"Officials who are giving attention to this problem point out that a
democracy cannot put up barriers at the factory gate, forbidding women
with small children to take employment; nor can it prohibit employers
from hiring women with small children.
"The War Manpower Commission has issued a policy statement stressing the fact that the first responsibility of women with young children
is to give suitable care in their own homes to their children, and that
in order that family life may not be unnecessarily disrupted, special
effort to secure the employment in industry of women with young
children should be deferred until full use has been made of all other
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sources of labor supply. It is further stated that when women with
young children are employed, adequate facilities should be provided
for the day care of those children."
However true it is that governmentally we cannot forbid women
with small children to take employment or prohibit employers from
hiring women with small children, nevertheless current unemployment
compensation decisions point out that governmentally we are putting
economic pressure on women with young children who want work to
take employment at the most undesirable hours. We seldom find unemployment compensation tribunals adopting the approach taken by the
Georgia Board of Review:
"When an employer establishes a business and employs a great number
of women to work in that business, the employer necessarily knows that
a great many of those women, if then unmarried, will in due course of
time, become married, and that in all probability there will be children,
and those women employees will owe a duty to those children which
will, for the benefit of society as a whole, outweigh any and all consideration of 'duty that the employee might owe to the employer. It
should also be remembered that employers have employed women genrally in industrial and commercial types of work because they could get
a greater amount of work out of the women for the money paid than
they could get out of men. That being true, if occasionally an employer
fails to get a reduction in the contributions to the Bureau on his payroll tax because some woman-the mother of children-has been paid
benefits while off duty, taking her chance of collecting the benefits or
going hungry rather than leave the children alone at night, that employer has no real, just cause for complaint.
"This is the age-old question as to the importance of the individual as
compared with and to the dollar. Our social legislation recognizes
that when it comes to weighing or balancing dollars against human
beings, that the human being should outweigh the dollar, otherwise
there would have been no social legislation.
"Keeping these things in mind, it occurs to the writer of this decision
that the mother of children, who is able to work, willing to work, and
available for work during the daytime, should not be disqualified from
receiving benefits merely because she considers the welfare of her children of paramount importance and elects to spend the night with them
rather than in the mill, when she cannot secure the services of someone
else to be with the children at night." 3'
POSSIBLE RULES
The Superior Court of Barrow County, Georgia, attempted in Carwood Mfg. Co. v,. Huiet1 to give an exact meaning to the word "available" as it is used in the Georgia statutes. The court said in part: "The

'321 U. C. I. S., 8254-Ga. R, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 12.

U. C. I. S., 8417-Ga. Ct. D, Ben. Ser., Vol. 7, No. 3.
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infinite variety of fact and circumstances which may present the question in the course of human experience would be difficult if not impossible to cover by exact language in one definition." Just as it is difficult to isolate the factors which comprise availability, so it is difficult
to determine which of these factors may be modified or withdrawn
(and this is essentially the problem of limited availability) and still
leave substantial availability3s* We are, therefore, presenting possible
rules for determining the availability issue in cases which involve shift
employment. Some- of these rules have been enunciated by courts and
administrative tribunals; others represent possible views which have
not been so enunciated.
1. ALL SUITABLE WORK ON ALL SrIFrs
The Connecticut court in the Dinovellis Case held that a claimant
in order to be available for work must be willing to accept any suitable
work, all hours, any shift. The South Carolina court in the second
Judson Mills Case was even more specific. The claimant not only
must be available for any suitable work; he must definitely be available
for the work which he had been doing on the same shift that he had
worked previously.
It would be possible, of course, to limit the statement of the rule
more than the above-mentioned cases have done. The rule with the
"good cause" limitation could be so stated: In order to be available for
work a claimant must be available for any suitable work which he has
no "good cause" for refusing. 'The lack of available suitable work for
a claimant or the good cause he may have for refusing otherwise suitable work will not, however, make available for work a claimant who
in fact is detached from the labor force.
2. Two OUT OF

THREE SHIFrS

In accordance with the holding in the first Judson Mills Case, a
claimant must be able and available for a majority of the average number of hours customarily worked each day in the industry. Thus, in
an industry which worked three shifts a day, a claimant in order to be
available for work would have to be available for work on two of the
three shifts. If work on two of the three shifts were unsuitable for the
claimant, it appears that the claimant should be required to be available
only for the shift which is suitable in order that the requirement be
consonant with the rule that a worker need be available only for suitable work.
"3 "Substantial availability" is not intended as a substitute concept
for "availt

ability" or "total availability." We use the phrase to denote a difference between a literal and a reasonable compliance with the statutory requirement.
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It further appears that the rule could be stated in terms which
would require the worker to be available for two out of three shifts,
except that he could limit himself to work on one shift in the event
that he would have good cause for refusing work on any other shift. 34

3. ONE SHIFT
Another possible rule with respect to what hours a claimant must
be willing to work in order to meet the eligibility requirements is that
a claimant must be available for only one shift. It would appear that
the validity of such a rule and indeed of any other would depend on
the particular conditions in the community. Apparently this rule would
take full account of any claimant's circumstances by allowing him to
select the shift on which he would be willing to work. There presumably
would be a decided bias in favor of day shifts. Since, in many instances, due to union contracts, seniority provisions, etc., work might
very well not be available to the claimant on the shift specified-by him,
it might be said that the claimant was not really available for work.
In such an instance, however, it is believed that the claimant's availability should not be reckoned in terms of whether or not there was
work available to him but solely on the basis of whether or not he was
available for work. Thus, in a case3 5 in which the claimant, mother
of a small child, was available for day work only, which the employer
was unable to give her, the Delaware Unemployment Compensation
Commission held that she was available for work. The Commission
said in part:
"Turning now to the instant case, we see a woman, a good worker who
is unable to work on the night shift because she can find no one to care
for her child. She is available for work during the day. Despite everincreasing night work due to defense industry, the daytime is unquestionably the normal period of work in this community. We have no
hesitation, therefore, in holding that claimant is available for work. We
are the happier to arrive at this decision because a contrary finding
would, in our opinion, render a real disservice to the social welfare of
the many children of -working parents in this city."

4. No

GENERAL RULE: FACTS OF EACH CASE CONTROLLING

It would be possible and we believe desirable to lay down no rule
as to the hours which a claimant must be willing to work in order to
be available for work. Thus, on a case by case basis, the deciding
tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, would consider all the
relevant facts in each case and decide accordingly. Domestic circumstances, social welfare, economic factors, working conditions in the
"' See discussion under 1.
'U. C. I. S., 7778-Del. R, Ben. Ser., Vol. 6, No. 2.
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community, etc., should all be weighed before arriving at a decision.
Since the number of possible variants of these factors is tremendous,
only on a case by case basis can equitable and accurate results be had
in each instance.
SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES

Since even decision on a case by case basis requires some controlling
principles, we would suggest the following broad propositions as guides.
Although they are general and applicable to the entire limited availability field, they should be helpful in shift employment cases.
A. (1) There is a proper distinction between limitations upon employability which are voluntarily imposed (e.g., the claimant who won't
accept night work simply because he "just doesn't like it") and those
which are involuntarily incurred (e.g., the claimant whose sight deficiencies prohibit him from working nights). This distinction has a
particular bearing in border-line cases of limited availability. In such
cases, all other things being equal, more evidence is required as to the
availability of a claimant who voluntarily limits his employability than
is required in the case of a claimant who has involuntarily incurred such
a limitation3O*
(2) The bases of this distinction are: (a) the fundamental purpose
of the unemployment compensation laws is the compensation of involuntary unemployment; (b) the essence of a claimant's availability is his
willingness to work.
This does not mean that to be available for work a worker must
abstain from voluntarily imposing any limitations upon his employability. Under certain conditions, a worker may, without destroying his
availability, impose various limitations upon his employability with no
better reason than his personal preference. What it does signify is this.
If the limitation existing upon the worker's employability leaves no
doubt that he is nevertheless attached to the active labor force and a
candidate for work, the reason for the limitation makes no difference.
If, on the other hand, it is clear that the limitation upon the worker's
employability removes him from the active labor force, then the reason
for the limitation will again have no effect upon the determination. In
those cases, however, where doubt exists as to whether or not the
limitation will serve to remove the worker from the active labor force,
we may and properly should look to the reason for the limitation. In
no* The term "voluntary" is used in this statement in a broader sense than
"done with one's consent" or "intentional."

As used here, it refers to "freedom

of choice; self-impelled; unconstrained by interference."

The woman who re-

fuses to accept night work because she can find no one to care for her baby, the
family man who refuses to accept work which would require him to move to a
town where there was wholly inadequate housing-such workers do not voluntarily limit their employability.
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such instances, limitations which are voluntarily imposed will more

readily result in a ruling that the claimant is unavailable for work than
if they are involuntarily incurred.
In any application of the foregoing proposition, it is essential to
remember that a limitation may change in character from one involuntarily incurred to one that is actually voluntary. The one-company
town which has been abandoned by the "company" furnishes a good
illustration. A worker who is left there may be said at the outset to
be suffering an involuntary limitation upon his availability. If he remains there, and insists upon staying, this limitation eventually becomes
voluntary. This "bridge" concept of limited availability is closely related to the idea that unemployment compensation was designed to
furnish a "bridge of benefits" between two periods of employment for
workers.
B. Availability for work requires no more than availability for
suitable work. It might reasonably be said, if qualified as we have suggested in Rule 1 above, that it requires no more than availability for
suitable work which the claimant has no good cause for refusing.
C. The work for which a claimant must be available can be determined only in relation to that particular claimant. It is individualized.
This is a corollary of (b) above. The suitability of work cannot be
determined abstractly, it has often been said, without consideration of
its appropriateness for a particular individual. This result is required
by the statutes which specify that certain criteria must be applied in
determining the suitability of work "for an individual."
D. The thesis that availability for work means attachment to the
active labor force furnishes us with certain other fundamental propositions. The active labor force consists of the workers who are employed
and the unemployed workers who are active candidates for jobs. Unemployment compensation, naturally is particularly concerned with the
latter group. These workers have services to sell to employers. When
they are unemployed, they are in the same position as merchants seeking buyers for their goods. The merchant is not required to sell or
offer for sale all the goods he is equipped to handle or even all the
goods he has in stock in order to retain his position in the market. All
he has to do is be prepared to sell a significant amount of merchandise
for which there is ordinarily a demand. Furthermore, the position of
the merchant depends wholly upon the amount of economic activity
existing in the business in which he wishes to engage. That economic
activity must be gauged in terms of the "locality" the merchant is to
serve. Thus, the would-be liquor store owner who seeks to do business
in a "dry" county is certainly out of business.
This same reasoning should apply to the unemployed members of
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the active labor force. They are merchants of services, selling their
labor to employers. As such, whether or not they are in business depends to a considerable extent upon the industrial practiceg in their
communities. This approach leads us to the following:
(1) Availability for work does not require availability for all suitable work. All it requires is availability for a substantial
amount of suitable work.
(2) The determination of what is a substantial amount of suitable
work depends largely upon the industrial practices in the labor
market area in which the claimant is willing and able to work.
(3) Availability for work does not require that a claimant be available for his customary or most recent work. If he satisfies the
condition expressed in (1) above, i.e., if he is available for a
substantial amount of suitable work, he has done all that is
required of him.
E. We would suggest this "rule" as to the effect of limitations on
employability. No limitation upon employability should be deemed to
render a claimant unavailable for work unless the limitation is such as
to show that the claimant is either unwilling or unable to accept a substantial amount of suitable work or unless it is such as to show that he
is not substantially usable in the labor market which is available to him.
More important than any "proposition" or "rule" we could formulate is a clear understanding that unemployment compensation is a
social program. It would appear highly desirable that wherever possible
the results of this program should be entirely consistent with the broad
social aims of the nation. Such consistency can never be attained if
legalism, allowed to run rampant in behalf of employer interests, is
permitted to distort a benefit-paying program into a "fund-protecting,"
tax-reducing system.

